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Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment
Geoffrey R. Stonet

Censorship is not an enterprise that attracts particularly subtle or
intelligent minds. It is not surprising, then, that Judge Richard Posner
has written the definitive judicial opinion rejecting the censorship of
violent video games. I take special pleasure in celebrating this opinion
because it shows off Judge Posner's ACLU side. Who would have
guessed?
I
In American Amusement Machine Association v Kendrick,' Judge

Posner invalidated an Indianapolis ordinance prohibiting operators of
video game parlors from allowing minors unaccompanied by a parent,
guardian, or other custodian to play video games that are "harmful to
minors." In enacting this ordinance, the Indianapolis City Council attempted to build on the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Ginsberg v
New York,' holding that government can constitutionally regulate material that is obscene for minors.' Under Ginsberg,Indianapolis could
constitutionally forbid operators of video game parlors from allowing
minors unaccompanied by a parent, guardian, or other custodian to
play video games that are obscene for minors.' The Indianapolis ordinance attempted to extend the logic of Ginsberg to material that is
violent, rather than sexual.
Closely tracking the definition of what is obscene for minors, the
ordinance restricted video games that contain graphic images of violence that visually depict "realistic serious injury to a human or human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, or disfiguration" and
also appeal primarily to "minors' morbid interest in violence," are
"patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community ...
1 Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I
would like to thank my colleagues Richard Epstein, Adam Samaha, and David Strauss for their
helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay, and the Frank Cicero Faculty Fund for
research support.
1 244 F3d 572 (7th Cir 2001).
2
390 US 629 (1968).
3
See id at 638.
4
See id at 637. Indeed, under Ginsberg, Indianapolis could flat-out prohibit minors from
playing video games that are obscene for minors, with or without parental permission. Id.
1857
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with respect to what is suitable" for minors, and lack "serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value" for minors.s
The central question in Kendrick was whether Indianapolis could
constitutionally analogize violence to sex. Judge Posner rejected the
analogy. As he put the point, "the fact that obscenity is excluded from
the protection of the principle that government may not regulate the
content of expressive activity" does not require "a like exclusion of
violent imagery."' But what's wrong with the analogy? Why is sexual
imagery different from violent imagery for purposes of the First
Amendment?
Posner conceded that there are some "intersections between the
concerns that animate obscenity laws and the concerns that animate the
Indianapolis ordinance," but concluded that "in general the concerns
are different."7 Specifically, Posner reasoned that the "main reason" for
the proscription of obscenity "is not that it is harmful," but "that it is
offensive." Obscenity is regulated because people find it "disgusting,
embarrassing, degrading, disturbing, outrageous, and insulting," not because it is "believed to inflict temporal (as distinct from spiritual)
harm." The Indianapolis ordinance, on the other hand, sought to regulate violent video games not because the images are offensive, but because of a belief that they "cause temporal harm by engendering aggressive attitudes and behavior, which might lead to violence."8
Posner's distinction is puzzling on several levels. First, one might
think that government should have more rather than less authority to
restrict expression that causes violence than expression that causes
offense. Not only is violence a more serious harm, but restricting
speech because its message offends seems inconsistent with core First
Amendment principles.'
Second, it is not at all clear that obscenity is regulated because
people find it "offensive," rather than because it is believed to inflict
harm. Offensiveness is part of the definition of obscenity. To be obscene, material must depict sexual conduct in a manner that "appeals
to the prurient interest," is "patently offensive," and "lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.,"' Material is "obscene"
because it has these three characteristics, but it nonetheless may be
5

Kendrick, 244 F3d at 573.
Id at 574.
7
Id.
8 Id at 574-75.
9 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L
Rev 189, 214-16 (1983) (summarizing Supreme Court case law establishing that the First
Amendment "does not permit government to prohibit the public expression of views merely
because they are offensive or unpopular").
10 Miller v California, 413 US 15,24 (1973).
6
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that obscenity can be regulated only because it is also believed to
cause harm.
Third, the Supreme Court has made clear that obscenity may be
regulated in part because it is harmful. In ParisAdult Theatre I v Slaton," for example, the Court explained that the "legitimate state interests" that justify the regulation of obscenity include "the public
safety," implicated by "an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime." 2
Fourth, the Indianapolis ordinance regulates violent video games
only if they depict violence in a manner that is "patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community ... with respect to what is

suitable material" for minors. Thus, like the obscenity doctrine, the
Indianapolis ordinance invokes both offensiveness and a possible correlation between the offensive material and crime. 4 Posner's distinction between offensiveness and harm therefore does not adequately
explain why the government can constitutionally regulate sexual but
not violent imagery.
II
We need to back up a bit. Why can the government constitutionally regulate obscene expression? Clearly, the reason is that such
speech is thought to be of only "low" First Amendment value. As the
Supreme Court explained in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire," "[t]here

are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech," such
as the "obscene" and the "libelous," that "are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."" The "prevention and punishment" of such classes of speech
"have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem," not
because they are especially harmful, but because they are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and do not further the values the
First Amendment was designed to promote.
This doctrine plays a central role in First Amendment jurisprudence. It explains why the government can regulate false statements of
fact, threats, incitement, commercial advertising, fighting words, and
obscenity. It is the concept of First Amendment "value," rather than
11 413
12
13
14
15
16
17

US 49 (1973).
Id at 57-58.
Kendrick, 244 F3d at 573.
Id at 574-75.
315 US 568 (1942).
Id at 571-72.
Id.
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either offensiveness or harm, which explains why Indianapolis can
constitutionally regulate video games that are obscene for minors.
But that still does not tell us why some sexual imagery is of "low"
First Amendment value, but violent imagery is not. Judge Posner examined at some length in Kendrick the value of violent expression.
"Violence," he observed, "has always been ... a central interest of hu-

mankind," and "classic literature and art," such as the Odyssey, The
Divine Comedy, and War and Peace, "are saturated with graphic

scenes of violence."" For the government to attempt to shield individuals, including minors, "from exposure to violent descriptions and
images would not only be quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them
unequipped to cope with the world as we know it.""9

This is all true. But Indianapolis was not trying to shield minors
from all depictions of violence, but only from those that graphically
portray such inhuman acts as decapitation, dismemberment, and mutilation and also are "patently offensive," appeal predominantly "to minors' morbid interest in violence," and lack "serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value."20 Surely, for Indianapolis to protect minors from such images would not leave them "unequipped to cope
with the world as we know it."2 1 Indeed, none of the works cited by
Judge Posner would be affected by the Indianapolis ordinance, even if
it applied to violent scenes in literature.
Moreover, everything Judge Posner said about violence applies
equally to sex. As the Supreme Court observed fifty years ago in Roth
v United States, "[s]ex, a great and mysterious motive force in human
life," has long been portrayed "in art, literature and scientific works"
and has "been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the
ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern." Throughout history, "classic" works of literature, such as
Ovid's Art of Love, FitzGerald'sRubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, and D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover,

have been "saturated with graphic scenes of [sex]." 4 To shield minors
"from exposure to [sexual] descriptions and images would not only be
quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them unequipped to cope with
the world as we know it."" If the First Amendment allows Indianapo-

18
19
20
21
22

23
24
2

Kendrick, 244 F3d at 575,577.
Id at 577.
Id at 573.
Id at 577.
354 US 476 (1957).
Id at 487.
Kendrick, 244 F3d at 575.
Id at 577.
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lis to regulate a small subset of sexual imagery because it is "patently
offensive," appeals primarily to the "prurient interest in sex," and
lacks "serious ... value," why shouldn't it also allow Indianapolis to

regulate a small subset of violent imagery that is "patently offensive,"
appeals primarily to the "morbid interest in violence," and lacks "serious ... value?",6

III
We return, then, to the question: why is obscenity of only low
First Amendment value? In Roth, the Court maintained that "implicit
in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance."27 To prove this assertion, the Court noted that thirteen of the fourteen states "which by
1792 had ratified the Constitution" provided "for the prosecution of
libel, and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or
both, statutory crimes."" Apparently, the Court's reasoning was that
because the states prohibited certain categories of expression despite
their own state constitutional guarantees of free speech, the Framers
of the First Amendment must have assumed that those classes of
speech were also unprotected by the First Amendment. This makes
sense. But, unfortunately, it tells us nothing about obscenity, for unlike
libel, blasphemy, and profanity, obscenity was not unlawful under either English or American law in 1792.
In England, the government first punished an obscene publication in 1727. In Dominus Rex v Curl29 the court sustained the conviction of Edward Curll for publishing Venus in the Cloister,Or the Nun

in Her Smock, an English translation of a French anti-Catholic tract
written around 1682. Venus in the Cloisterwas an explicit depiction of
rampant sex among monks and nuns in a convent. It dealt quite
graphically with voyeurism, masturbation, fornication, dildos, and
flagellation. The King's Bench held that Curll's publication was "punishable at common law, as an offense against the peace, in tending to
weaken the bonds of civil society, virtue, and morality.""' In fact, the
prosecution had less to do with the sexual nature of the material than
with Curll's "long-running battle with the authorities" and his recent

26
27
28
29
30

Id at 573.
354 US at 484.
Id at 482.
2 Strange 788 (1727).
Id at 791.
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publication of several politically libelous works that had infuriated
public officials.31
Thereafter, obscenity prosecutions pretty much disappeared in
England for the remainder of the eighteenth century, despite a profusion of sexually explicit writings. The Toast, for example, a satirical
work published in 1736, has been described "as one of the most obscene works ever printed" in England,32 and Gervaise de Latouche's
History of Don B, published in England in 1743, portrayed in graphic
detail the hero's nocturnal orgies with monks and nuns.33 Neither was
prosecuted as obscene. Moreover, English readers in the eighteenth
century had ready access to a constant stream of sexually explicit and
lewd ballads, poems, novels, whore catalogues, sex guides, erotic prints,
licentious newspapers and magazines, and pornographic anti-Catholic
and antigovernment tracts." But for almost a century after Curl, English law yielded nothing of consequence on the concept of obscenity.
There was no definition of the concept, no rationale for its regulation,
and only sporadic skirmishes over the matter. As one commentator
described the situation, until the early nineteenth century the authorities "seem to have been doing little else than casual bloodletting, and

31 See Pat Rogers and Paul Baines, The Prosecutionsof Edmund Curll, 1725-28,5 Library:
The Transactions of the Bibliographical Society 189 (2004) (discussing the context of Curll's
prosecution). See also Julie Peakman, Mighty Lewd Books: The Development of Pornographyin
Eighteenth-Century England 39-44 (Palgrave 2003) (describing censorship and prosecutions for
obscenity in eighteenth century England, including Curll's); Frederick F Schauer, The Law of
Obscenity 5-6 (Bureau of National Affairs 1976) (noting that Curll "was a constant source of
political irritation, and his prosecution ... had obvious political motives"); Albert P. Gerber, Sex,
Pornography,and Justice 66-67 (Lyle Stuart 1965) (noting that if Curll's "book had not had
religious overtones it probably would have passed unnoticed"); Alec Craig, The Banned Books
of England and Other Countries:A Study of the Conception of Literary Obscenity 29-32 (Allen &
Unwin 1962) (providing a narrative account of Curll's prosecution and its aftermath).
32 George Ryley Scott, "Into Whose Hands": An Examination of Obscene Libel in Its Legal, Sociologicaland LiteraryAspects 142 (Waron 1945) (analyzing scandalous or graphic works
banned without prosecution).
33 Here is an excerpt from History of Don B:
Sometimes I was put on a bench, completely naked; one Sister placed herself astride my throat
in such a way that my chin was hidden in her pubic hair, another one put herself on my belly, a
third one, who was on my thighs, tried to introduce my prick into her cunt; two others again
were placed at my sides so that I could hold a cunt in each hand; and finally another one, who
possessed the nicest breast, was at my head, and bending forward, she pushed my face between her bubbies; all of them were naked, all rubbed themselves, all discharged; my thighs,
my belly, my chest, my prick, everything was wet, I floated while fucking.
Quoted in Peter Wagner, Eros Revived: Erotica of the Enlightenment in England and America
236 (Secker and Warburg 1988).
3
See id at 6,87-112, 248-55; Roy Porter, Mixed Feelings:The Enlightenment and Sexuality
in Eighteenth-CenturyBritain,in Paul-Gabriel Bouc6, ed, Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain
8 (Manchester 1982).
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the few shots fired [were] mostly blanks.",3 In the 1790s, when the
United States was contemplating the36 First Amendment, London was
awash with sexually explicit material.
The first prosecution for obscenity in the United States did not
occur until 1815, almost a quarter century after the adoption of the
First Amendment, when a Pennsylvania court declared it an offense to
exhibit for profit a drawing of a nude couple." The Supreme Court's
claim in Roth that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance" was misleading, at best. Indeed, the most striking fact about
that era was the absence of any laws regulating such material. What
the Court did in Roth was to extrapolate from regulations of libel,
blasphemy, and profanity to regulations of obscenity. It was that extrapolation that required the Court's subtle use of the word "implicit."
But the real lesson "implicit" in the origins of the First Amendment is
that at the time the First Amendment was enacted obscenity was
treated completely differently from libel, blasphemy, and profanity."

IV
Still, we are left with the question: why is obscenity of only low
First Amendment value? It is difficult to answer this question definitively because the Supreme Court has never offered a clearly defined
theory of low-value speech. The case law, however, suggests that several factors are relevant to the analysis. First, categories of low-value
speech (for example, false statements of fact, threats, commercial advertising, fighting words, express incitement of unlawful conduct, and
obscenity) do not primarily advance political discourse. Second, categories of low-value speech are not defined in terms of disfavored ideas
or political viewpoints.39 Third, low-value speech usually has a strong
35 Leo M. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv L Rev 40, 47 (1938)
(tracing obscenity law from the prosecution of Sir Charles Sedley to the attempted banning of
Ulysses).
36 See Peakman, Mighty Lewd Books at 12,44 (cited in note 31).
37 Commonwealth v Sharpless, 2 Serg & Rawle 91 (Pa 1815) (referring to common law
principles to uphold a conviction for showing an obscene drawing for profit).
38 Moreover, because modern First Amendment doctrine treats neither blasphemy nor
profanity as low-value speech, and narrowly defines libel as covering only false statements of
fact, it is clear that the Court has not treated the judgments of the Framers as controlling. The
Court's invocation in Roth of the purported understanding of the Framers was therefore not
only inaccurate, but also misleading insofar as it implied that the Framers' understanding controls First Amendment doctrine. (All of this, by the way, underscores the dangers of "originalism"
as a mode of constitutional interpretation.)
39 See American Booksellers Association v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 327 (7th Cir 1985), affd
475 US 1001 (1986) (observing that "[u]nder the First Amendment the government must leave to
the people the evaluation of ideas").
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noncognitive impact on its audience.' Fourth, categories of low-value
speech have long been regulated without undue harm to the overall
system of free expression.
Obscenity satisfies all four of these criteria. First, obscenity does
not predominantly advance political discourse. Of course, sexually
explicit expression can communicate implicit or even explicit political
messages. But, by definition, obscenity is primarily sexual rather than
political expression. A video of two or more people engaged in sexual
intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, and anal intercourse for ninety minutes is not predominantly political in nature.
Second, obscenity is not defined in terms of disfavored ideas or
political viewpoints. Rather, it is defined by its graphic depiction of sex
and the offensiveness of that depiction. Whatever ideas or viewpoints
obscenity might convey can readily be communicated without resort
to obscenity. In this sense, obscenity is "no essential part of any exposition of ideas"" and may be seen more as a means of communication
than as an idea or point of view in itself. Material can be obscene regardless of its underlying "point of view." It can be obscene without
regard to whether it celebrates or condemns oral sex or adultery.
Third, obscenity has a strong noncognitive impact on its audience.
A goal of the First Amendment is to promote expression that engages
the thought process and attempts to reinforce or alter opinions and
attitudes by rational persuasion. Most forms of low-value speech have
a different impact. Threats, for example, affect people's behavior not
by persuasion but by coercion. The First Amendment is not designed
to foster speech that influences people by intimidation. A threat may
literally be "speech," but its primary effect is analogous to twisting
someone's arm.42 Similarly, fighting words have only low value in part
because they are equivalent to a physical assault. Hurling a personal
epithet at another person in a face-to-face encounter is more like spitting in his eye than engaging him in debate. Express incitement of
unlawful conduct that creates a likely and imminent danger of harm
40 I say "usually" because this characteristic is not present for all categories of low-value
speech. False statements of fact, for example, do not share this characteristic. Nonetheless, this
seems an important if not a necessary factor in low-value analysis. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L J 589, 603 (stating that speech "that has purely
noncognitive appeal will be entitled to less constitutional protection").
41 Chaplinsky, 315 US at 572.
42
See Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003) ("[Flighting words ... are generally proscribable under the First Amendment.... [T]he First Amendment also permits a state to ban a

'true threat."'); Edward Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 59-60 (Oxford 1989)

(explaining why coercive speech receives less constitutional protection); Kent Greenawalt,
Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language 94 (Oxford 1989) (distinguishing protected "warning

threats" from unprotected "manipulative threats").
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has a similar quality. Like Justice Holmes's false cry of fire in a
crowded theater," such speech triggers an immediate response that is
not based on reflective thought.44 Obscenity is similar. When we say
that obscenity predominantly appeals to the "prurient interest in
sex,"45 we mean, in part, that obscenity creates an immediate physiological response of sexual arousal. In this sense, obscenity is like a sexy
stroke on the thigh or a vibrator. It is, in effect, a sex aid-a device to
stimulate sexual excitement. That it achieves this effect by imagery
rather than by physical contact does not alter its essential nature. Like
threats and fighting words, obscenity is low-value speech in part because its primary impact is noncognitive.6
Fourth, there is a long history of obscenity regulation in the
United States. Although there was no clear consensus in 1792 that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment, obscenity has in fact
been regulated by every state in the nation since Anthony Comstock
launched his anti-obscenity campaign in the 1860s. By the time of Chaplinsky, the Court could accurately state that obscenity was one of those
"limited classes of speech" that had long been recognized as subject to
government regulation without raising "any Constitutional problem.""
In light of these four criteria, a reasonable case can be made for
the proposition that obscenity is properly characterized as low-value
speech, within the meaning of First Amendment doctrine.
V
If speech has only low First Amendment value when it appeals
primarily to the prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to contemporary community standards concerning the depiction of sex, and
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, shouldn't the
same be true for speech that appeals primarily to the morbid interest
in violence, is patently offensive to contemporary community standards concerning the depiction of violence, and lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value? Why should we give more constitutional protection to images of violence than to images of sex?

43 See Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919) ("[TJhe most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic").
44
Commercial advertising does not necessarily cause a noncognitive response, but it has
persuasively been characterized as merely a form of economic conduct. See Thomas H. Jackson
and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 Va L Rev 1, 14-25 (1979).
45 Kendrick, 244 F3d at 573.
46 See Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenityand "Obscenity": An Exercise
in the Interpretationof ConstitutionalLanguage,67 Georgetown L J 899,920-28 (1979).
47 See 315 US at 571-72.
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The first two criteria, which support the judgment that obscenity is
of only low First Amendment value, are also satisfied by the types of
images regulated by the Indianapolis ordinance. The class of speech
covered by the ordinance does not predominantly advance political
discourse and is not defined in a way that clearly disfavors any particular idea or point of view. As a class, depictions of hardcore violence, like
depictions of hardcore sex, are not inherently political in nature. It is
less clear, however, whether the third criterion is satisfied. The noncognitive, physiological response to hardcore depictions of sex is unmistakable and it seems reasonable to analogize obscenity to various types of
conduct that create the same sexual response. But there is no consensus
that violent images have such an impact. Violent images have a variety
of effects on viewers, but they are not primarily noncognitive. Certainly,
repeated exposure to such images might have a coarsening effect that
gradually inures the viewer to the horrors of violence, but many forms
of expression (including political advertising) have such an effect. That
is quite different from what we mean by noncognitive impact in the
contexts of obscenity, fighting words, threats, and incitement. Obscenity
is sex; violent images are not violence.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the United States has a long
history of regulating obscene expression, but it has no tradition of
regulating violent speech.i Not only was violent expression not included in the Chaplinsky list, but the Court made clear almost sixty
years ago that speech focusing on "deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime"
is "as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature."" Indeed, in the entire history of American law there have
been almost no efforts to regulate the depiction of violence.so As Posner rightly observed, "the notion of forbidding not violence itself, but
pictures of violence, is a novelty."" As a consequence, we have no
shared understanding of what we might mean by low-value violent
speech. Indeed, we lack even a word analogous to "obscenity" with
which to describe the concept of violent expression.
As Judge Posner reasoned in Kendrick, images of violence are a
fundamental part of our history, culture, and politics. Can we imagine
See Kendrick, 244 F3d at 578.
Winters v New York, 333 US 507, 508, 510 (1948) (voiding for vagueness a New York
state statute banning, among other things, the sale of publications containing stories of such deeds).
50 See Ian Matheson Ballard, Jr., See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Television Violence and the
First Amendment, 81 Va L Rev 175, 194 (1995) (noting that "history ... does not support" the
classification of media violence as unprotected speech); Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L.A.
Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: FirstAmendment Principlesand Social Science Theory, 64 Va L Rev
1123, 1199 (1978) (reporting that nothing in the statutes of the American colonies suggested
"that depictions of violence in literature should or could be suppressed").
51 Kendrick, 244 F3d at 575-76.
48
49
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censors reviewing films like Saving Private Ryan and Schindler's List

to determine whether their depictions of violence are of low First
Amendment value? Can we imagine censors making it a crime for
Time magazine or CNN to show images of terrorist beheadings or of
Mai Lai because such depictions are thought to offend contemporary
community standards?
Of course, we allow just that in the realm of sex. But that is precisely why history is relevant. At least with obscenity, we have managed over many years to develop reasonably workable standards. To
start from scratch in the realm of violence, after eschewing that approach for more than two centuries, would open a Pandora's box that
is both unnecessary and unwise.
This analysis suggests that the list of low-value categories should
be effectively frozen. There are obvious objections to such a conclusion. There may be sound reasons to recognize new categories of lowvalue speech as society, technology, First Amendment theory, and our
understanding of human behavior change over time. But the recognition of new categories of low-value speech that have no historical
pedigree poses real dangers. The very concept of low-value speech is
inherently problematic. As Thomas Emerson observed, the doctrine
inevitably involves the courts in "value judgments concerned with the
content of expression," a role that is awkward, at best, in light of "the
basic theory of the First Amendment."" Placing great weight on tradition in this context is a reasonable way to capture the benefits of the
doctrine without inviting freewheeling judicial judgments about constitutional "value.""
Proponents of the Indianapolis ordinance would no doubt respond that the ordinance did not impose a full-blown prohibition of
hardcore violent images, but only a regulation of speech for minors.
As Judge Posner noted, however, "[c]hildren have First Amendment
rights."M Indeed, children "must be allowed the freedom to form their
political views on the basis of uncensored speech before they turn

Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 326 (Random House 1970).
Cass Sunstein has astutely observed that the low-value theory is essential to "any wellfunctioning system of free expression" because without it one of two "unacceptable" results
would follow: either (1) "the burden of justification imposed on government" when it regulates
high-value speech, such as pure political expression, "would have to be lowered"; or (2) "the
properly stringent standards applied to efforts to regulate" high value speech would have to be
applied to low-value speech, with the result that government would not be able to regulate
speech "that in all probability should be regulated." Cass R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution
233-34 (Harvard 1993).
5
Kendrick, 244 F3d at 576.
52

53
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eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise
the franchise.""
Moreover, the analogy to Ginsberg fails. In Ginsberg, the Court
held that some sexually explicit material that may not be obscene for
adults may nonetheless be obscene for children and that the government may therefore shield children from such material. Thus, the government may constitutionally prohibit video stores from renting Xrated videos to twelve-year-olds and may constitutionally prohibit
video game parlors from letting twelve-year-olds play X-rated video
games. As long as it is possible to protect children from such material
without unduly interfering with the rights of adults, the Court has upheld such regulations."
But that principle has no application to the regulation of violent
expression. The Ginsberg "obscene for minors" doctrine is premised
on the predicate judgment that there exists a category of expressionobscenity-that is of only low First Amendment value. The key question
in Ginsberg was whether the definition of obscenity may differ for children and adults. In the context of violent images, however, there is no
predicate category of low-value speech on which to premise a broader
definition with respect to children. Ginsbergis therefore irrelevant.
Of course, the government has an interest in the well-being of minors, and it may in appropriate circumstances protect minors from harmful expression. But as the Court explained in Erznoznik v Jacksonville,"
[M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-defined
circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.... Speech that is neither obscene as to
youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot
be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.
Applying this principle, courts have consistently rejected the argument that the government may shield minors from otherwise constitutionally protected images merely because the government thinks
Id at 577.
If the government cannot protect minors without interfering with the rights of adults,
the regulation is presumptively unconstitutional. See generally, for example, United States v
55
56

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc, 529 US 803 (2000) (invalidating the "signal bleed" provision
of the Telecommunications Act, which required cable operators to either scramble sexually
explicit channels or limit programming on such channels to certain hours); Reno v ACLU, 521
US 844 (1997) (affirming an injunction against enforcement of Communications Decency Act,
which sought to bar minors from harmful or indecent material on the internet).
57
422 US 205 (1975).
58 See id at 212-14.
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such exposure "might do them harm."" As Judge Posner observed,
"[t]his is not merely a matter of pressing the First Amendment to a
dryly logical extreme," for "[p]eople are unlikely to become wellfunctioning, independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if
they are raised in an intellectual bubble.".
VI
I come to praise Posner, not to harry him, but I find one facet of
his opinion in Kendrick troubling. Indianapolis argued that its ordinance was constitutional because playing violent video games might
harm children psychologically and/or cause them to engage in violent
behavior. To support this contention, the city presented "a pair of empirical studies by psychologists which found that playing a violent
video game tends to make young people more aggressive in their attitudes and behavior.",6 Posner held that the studies were not sufficient
to justify the regulation, because they did "not find that video games
have ever caused anyone to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive."62
The implication of this passage might be that with more persuasive evidence of harm the government could constitutionally prohibit
minors from viewing images of violence. This is too low a standard. If
violent images are not low-value speech, then only a showing of clear
and present danger should be sufficient to regulate such expression.
Otherwise, the government would be empowered upon a similar
showing to deny minors access to any speech that has caused harm to
some minors or caused some minors "to commit a violent act." In this
passage of his opinion, which happily is only dictum, Judge Posner
seemed to revert to his more poetic rendition of what he has described as the true meaning of the First Amendment: "A. * Bx =
-(pH / (1 + d)"+ O),."6 That is, the First Amendment is all about bal-

59 See, for example, Video Software DealersAssociation v Maleng, 325 F Supp 2d 1180,1186
(WD Wash 2004) (striking down a Washington statute penalizing the distribution to minors of
violent video games). See also Interactive Digital Software Association v St. Louis County, 329
F3d 954, 959-60 (8th Cir 2003) (requiring that a government entity seeking to regulate violent
material present compelling evidence that it is harmful for children in order to avoid invalidation
under the First Amendment); Video Software Dealers Association v Webster, 968 F2d 684, 688
(8th Cir 1992) (striking down a Missouri statute barring distribution of violent video games to
minors).
6
Kendrick, 244 F3d at 576-77.
61 Id at 574.
62
Id at 578-79.
63 Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in Lee C. Bollinger
and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds, Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modem Era 121, 126 (Chicago
2002) (setting out the formula for the optimal strictness of speech regulation).

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1869 2007

1870

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:1857

ancing costs and benefits. Posner's suggestion that with a bit more
proof of harm Indianapolis might be able to save its ordinance might
be taken to impeach the rest of his opinion, were the rest of his opinion not so compelling in its reasoning.
VII
I would be remiss if I did not mention at least in passing some of
the other features I most like about Judge Posner's opinion in Kendrick. Not only does it reach the right result for (pretty much) the
right reasons, but it also displays the ease with which Posner cuts to the
heart of an issue, his intense curiosity, and his unique sense of whimsy.
Those who seek to regulate violent video games invariably argue
that video games are more harmful than literature or movies because
they are interactive. Posner dismissed this argument with a flourish:
[Tjhis point is superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature (here
broadly defined to include movies, television, and other photographic media, and popular as well as highbrow literature) is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it
is successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify
with the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with
them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the reader's own.
One might suspect Posner was an English major.
With apparent relish, Posner described the videogames in the record:
Take ... "The House of the Dead." The player is armed with a

gun-most fortunately, because he is being assailed by a seemingly unending succession of hideous axe-wielding zombies, the
living dead conjured back to life by voodoo. The zombies have already knocked down and wounded several people, who are
pleading pitiably for help, and one of the player's duties is to protect those unfortunates from renewed assaults by the zombies.
His main task, however, is self-defense. Zombies are supernatural
beings, therefore difficult to kill. Repeated shots are necessary to
stop them as they rush headlong toward the player.
Reading this, it is hard not to imagine Posner hunched over his
computer, striving frantically to decimate the surging zombies. After
describing The House of the Dead, Posner playfully noted that "[s]elf64
Note that a holding that the government may not make it unlawful for minors to play
violent video games does not mean that their parents may not prohibit them from doing so.
65 Kendrick, 244 F3d at 577.
6
Id.
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defense, protection of others, dread of the 'undead,' fighting against
overwhelming odds-these are age-old themes of literature," and that
"[i]t is conceivable that pushing a button or manipulating a toggle
stick engenders an even deeper surge of aggressive joy" in the player
than in the reader or viewer." After reading Posner's description, I
was ready to run out to buy The House of the Dead for my four-yearold granddaughter.
Richard Posner's legacy will not turn on his opinion in Kendrick.
But in this little opinion he demonstrated some of the qualities that
have made him one of the great judges of his generation: a fierce intellectual curiosity, a genuine engagement with ideas, an eagerness to cut
through the legal babble to get to the core of the issue, and an evident
delight in occasionally reaching results that startle admirers and critics
alike.

67

Id at 577-79.
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